an adolescent; then, in a smooth succession, through Harvard College, through Harvard Medical School, and on to an internship at the Massa chusetts General Hospital. Later-"through family position, acquain tances, well-wishers on the Staff and Board of Trustees," he says, meaning to disparage-he was appointed assistant surgeon there. "Of ten at the head of my school," he tells us, and enjoying opportunities that he describes as "exceptional, in [that] particular period of history, in the stage of [the] development of surgery, and in social and educa tional advantages," he was fashioned for success, as the world reckons success, but for one inveterate flaw: the "end result idea," as he was to call it.
It came to him as this century dawned, taking hold and slowly grow ing in his mind, and also finding benign, practical applications in his early work at the Massachusetts General. There was, then, a turning point, an experience such as Saul might have had on the road to Damascus. Codman fixes precisely the time and the circumstances. It is a day in the summer of 1910. Ernest Codman and Edward Martin are in a hansom cab on the way back to London from the Tuberculosis Sanatorium at Ftimly, where they had gone for a visit. Codman de scribes the "end result idea," and Martin, himself a driven man, seizes upon it as the "catalyst to crystallize" his own obsession: the formation of an American College of Surgeons. It strikes both men that the mea surement of end results is the tool by which all claims to special surgi cal competence would be verified, and the practice of surgery in hospitals "standardized."
From here on, the end result idea was to become for Codman, as he openly says, a "dominant idea," a "monomania." So consuming was this preoccupation that Codman, beginning to doubt his own sanity, consulted two friends whom he describes as "distinguished alienists"; he received the oracular reply that only the soundness of the obsessing idea distinguishes the healthy from the sick.
The story of Codman's life documents many other interests and ac complishments, among them pioneering work on the radiology of nor mal and diseased bones, early studies of duodenal ulcer, a registry of bone sarcoma, and a treatise on injuries of the shoulder. But it is the end result idea, he says, when already a man of 60, that was "the great and still unsuccessful interest of my life." It impelled him to ventures remarkable for their honesty and courage, but also to actions that seemed needlessly rash, provocative, and ostentatious. It led him to disgrace, notoriety, isolation, and near financial ruin. It also set him, as I hope to show, on the road to immortality.
As the summer of 1911 drew to a close, Codman, beginning to doubt the likelihood of advancement for himself, or of implementation for his ideas, at the Massachusetts General Hospital, opened a small hospital of his own. Three years later, after 15 years of service, and im mediately after his "senior" had been "moved . . . up a step," he re signed his post at the Massachusetts General Hospital, only to reapply on the very day he received notice that his resignation had been ac cepted. He asked "to be appointed Surgeon-in-Chief on the ground that the results of my treatment of patients at their hospital during the last ten years, had been better than those of other surgeons. . . ." It was a calculatingly dramatic, even provocative, act, meant to bring "to the notice of the trustees" his "protest against the seniority system of promotion, which was obviously incompatible with the End Result Idea." It did not make him friends.
He achieved even greater notoriety when, in the following year, he chaired a meeting of the Suffolk County Medical Society dedicated to a "Discussion of Hospital Efficiency." At this meeting, Codman ar ranged to have "unveiled with a great flourish," a "cartoon" which depicted the residents of Boston's Back Bay as an ostrich with its head deep in the sand, kicking back golden eggs of remunerative surgical in terventions in the direction of Harvard's doctors, while the trustees of the Massachusetts General Hospital on one side of the river, and the president of the university on the other, cannot decide whether or not the tmth about the inappropriateness of these interventions can be dis closed (Fig. 1) . Codman describes the reaction: the audience at first open mouthed, "aghast," then in an "uproar," some walking out, others rising to protest in anger, but a "great m ajority" simply "am used." Later, for Codman, there was to be "disgrace," a loss of friends, resigna tion as chairman of the local medical society, separation from his post as instructor of surgery at Harvard, and a noticeable dip in income. Disillu sioned and embittered, he had only his hospital to fall back upon.
This little hospital, sometimes described as having 10 beds and sometimes 12, was "a modified apartment house in a rather crowded part of the city . . . a decided contrast to the marble halls and spotless corridors of the Charitable Hospitals," those lofty institutions he so loved to castigate. "There is often dust in our corners," he admits, "the floors are wood, the instrument boiler cost $0.87, the hot-water sioned as to the possibility of altering the ways of human nature by my intellectual efforts." A period of remunerative work and relative prosperity followed, and a rehabilitation of sorts, marked by a rap prochement to both the Harvard Medical School and the Massachusetts General Hospital. Then, the dormant passions caught fire again. "I subtly drifted," he says, "into the organization of the Registry of Bone Sarcoma"; and later he undertook the work, to last four years, of writ ing his treatise on The Sh ou ld er, which he privately published in 1934. His purpose in embarking on these projects, he tells us in a marvelous preface and an epilogue to his book, was to demonsuate once again, the fecundity of the end result idea. It was, he maintained, the chief achievement of his life and, childless himself, his legacy to his family and the world. "I shall have left," he wrote, anticipating his death a scant seven years later, "to the children o f my great nieces and nephews, more than a money value, although they will share it with all the other heirs of the world."
The End Result Idea and System
Like so many profound insights, the end result idea is simplicity itself. In Codman's own words, it is "merely the common-sense notion that every hospital should follow every patient it treats, long enough to de termine whether or not the treatment has been successfiil, and then to inquire 'if not, why not?' with a view to preventing a similar failure in the future."
To implement the idea, Codman devised what he called the end re sult system. Each patient was to have an "end result card" on which were to be entered "in the briefest possible terms," the symptoms, the diagnosis that governed the treatment, the treatment plan, the compli cations that occurred in the hospital, the diagnosis at discharge, and "the result each year afterward," until a definitive determination of the results could be made. Thus, both the accuracy o f the initial diagnosis and the results of treatment were to be recorded and assessed. But if lengthy follow-up were not possible, at least the events during the hospitalization could be recorded and reviewed; and if all cases could not be studied, much could still be learned from an investigation of inhospital deaths alone.
To review and assess the care briefly recorded on the end result cards, there was to be in each hospital an "efficiency committee" repre senting the board of trustees, the administrators, and the medical staff. The committee would note the occurrence of unsatisfactory results, de termine the reasons for failing to attain "perfection," and take appro priate action, both to deal with individual instances of failure, and to guide the policies, organization, and operations of the hospital in gen eral. The committee would keep a written account of its proceedings, and perhaps publish a periodic summary of its observations and actions.
It is easy to conclude, on the face of it, that Codman advocated a monitoring of what we would now call "outcomes." Yet, in the more detailed accounting that Codman gives of each of the 141 deaths that occurred under his care during his 15 years at the Massachusetts Gen eral Hospital, and of each of the 337 cases he cared for in his own hos pital during its first few years, the "results" of care are never described alone. There is always a judgment as to whether or not the result in each case might have been improved, and a statement of the probable causes of failing to attain perfection. It is the concurrent assessment of the care and of its consequences that is the hallmark o f Codman's method. In his system, the occurrence of adverse outcomes is only the occasion for an assessment of what we would now call "process. To establish more clearly the relation between care and its results it is necessary to record the findings o f a larger number of observations. Codman offers us two aids to accomplish this. The first is a classifica tion of the causes for not attaining perfection. These are as follows: "lack of technical knowledge or skill," "lack of surgical judgment," "lack o f diagnostic skill," "lack o f care or equipment," "personal or so cial conditions preventing cooperation of the patient," "the patient's unconquerable disease," and "the calamities of surgery or the accidents and complications over which we have no known control." Clearly, some o f these are attributable to the doctor, some to the hospital, some to the patient or his circumstances, and some to the nature of the illness itself; some are remediable, while others are not.
The second aid to the compilation and analysis of cases that Codman devised was a classification o f cases. This was a matrix o f 29 vertical di visions he called "anatomic," and of nine horizontal divisions he called "pathologic," creating 261 cells in all. In each cell would be entered the cases that belonged there, each designated by its own distinguish ing number. Codman developed his classification at much sacrifice of time and income. He dwells lovingly on it, describing the satisfaction it gave him to enter his cases, marked in several distinguishing ways, hoping that none of its little squares would remain unoccupied. He offered it as a means for rapidly finding similar cases whose end results could be studied, perhaps by comparison to similar cases elsewhere, or, at intervals, in the same hospital.
Although Codman understood the relation between the nature and severity of illness, on the one hand, and the likelihood o f improve ment, on the other, case-mix standardization, as we know it today, did MI not occur to him. Perhaps this is because statistical standardization is redundant when judgments about the appropriateness or goodness of care are made case by case, on clinical grounds. Even now, we have no system o f case-mix adjustment that fully obviates the necessity for that final, clinical ascertainment.
End Results as the Product of Care
Having come so far, Codman might well have stopped. What is to ex plain his not doing so? To what is to be attributed the remarkable force and fecundity of the end result idea, its capacity to proliferate in so many directions, to appear in such diverse guises, until it obsesses its creator and seems to pervade the health care system as a whole? Very simply, it is because the end result, as Codman perceived, was the only true product of health care.
In a remarkable paper, "The Product of a Hospital," described as the "opening gun" in the campaign to promote the end result system as the vehicle for standardizing hospitals, Codman (1914b) recognizes that a hospital has many products, including new knowledge and edu cated health care professionals. But when it comes to health care. whether provided by an individual practitioner or purveyed by an insti tution, it is the end result that counts. Concretely, the desired product is "the satisfied and relieved patient"; mote abstractly, the product is the improvement in health attributable to care.
By specifying the product in this way, Codman intends to demystify health care, to rid it of the "humbug" with which, he said, it was universally infested. Some instances of care, Codman admits, are "like a priceless painting, incomparable in value," but much care, in his opinion, is "an ordinary commercial article," whose quality can be standardized, and that can be produced more efficiendy, as a "boot" might be, by specialization and division of labor, and by adjusting the volume of production to the laborer's capacity to work well. Thus, the end result idea becomes, for Codman, the vital link between the sci ence of medicine and the science of management. In his own words, "the end result system means the introduction of the Comparative Principle into Clinical Science, and it means the use of the Principles o f Scientific Management in Hospital Organization."
Codman's Concept of Efficiency
Codman's adherence to these "principles" explains, as Reverby (1981) points out, his use of the word "efficiency" (which, she says, was "the keyword o f his era") rather than "quality" in describing the smicture. purposes, and consequences of his system. But "efficiency," in Codman's lexicon, is a word with many meanings. Most fundamentally, it is "therapeutic efficiency," a property that "demands the best possible application o f recorded knowledge to each case," so that treatment can be "as successful as possible." Codman is also concerned with avoiding "useless" visits, unnecessarily prolonged hospital stays, and, in particu lar, those "avoidable errors" whose cumulative cost, he reminds us, "is greater than the cost of good medical care." Furthermore, inefficiency occurs not only because doctors fail, but also because, in organizations and systems, work is not conducted in a manner that accomplishes "maximum output per hour," patients are not assigned or referred to those best able to help them, and resources are not apportioned accord ing to their contribution to end results. Thus, what today we might call "effectiveness," "clinical efficiency," "production efficiency," and "efficiency of allocation," are all subsumed by Codman's sovereign concept -a concept that becomes almost a moral principle when Codman says, "Efficiency must acknowledge Truth and use it in a truthful way. It is the scientific use of science." "I claim," Codman declared, "that the adoption of the End Result System by the hospitals of this country will at the same time render our work more scientific and our practice more efficient and honorable." By using the end result system, Codman hoped to propel the practice of medicine from "humbug," masquerading as "art," to a science, and from a craft to almost an industry-in short, from obscurantism to ra tionality; hence the diverse uses of the end result system.
The Uses of End Result Assessment M onitoring Q uality
The most obvious of the uses to which end result assessment was to be put is what we would call, today, "quality monitoring and assurance." Though Codman rarely used the word "quality," preferring to speak o f "good results" and "efficiency," it is quite clear that a major purpose of the end result system, and of the efficiency committees that were to implement it, was to bring about those improvements in health care, in both its interpersonal and technical aspects, that the then current state of knowledge permitted. This would come about partly through the tactful, but firm, leadership o f clinical chiefs, as they discussed with each member o f their staffs his record o f performance. But largely, change was to be induced by modifications in the organization of health care and the management of health care institutions. Cod man was acutely aware of the profound effect the incentives offered by organizations, as well as their other properties, could have on individ ual behavior, that of physicians included.
A dvancing C lin ical Science
As a second contribution o f even more far-reaching importance, the study o f end results would help create that foundation o f clinical knowledge upon which all practice depends. Most immediately, the study of his own end results by each doctor would be a means for con tinuing education. Standing, as he did, with one foot in the academic world and the other in the realm of practice, and painfully aware of the deficiencies in the clinical science of his day, Codman saw much of surgical practice as a succession of "experiments," but experiments con ducted haphazardly, their results unstudied, unrecorded, and un disclosed. The end result system would change all that, revealing to each doctor an undistorted picture of both his successes and failures, provided an unselccted succession o f cases were studied. He could then learn which cases he could treat better, which cases he should refer to others, and which subjects are deserving of further research. By this progression, the implementation of the end result system in the work o f doctors and hospitals would get linked to the realm of more system atic, more rigorous research.
To effect this linkage, Codman devised a grand scheme for technol ogy assessment and diffusion to be directed by a committee of the American College of Surgeons. The first inklings of a discovery would appear in the end results attained by individual physicians as they in troduced their particular innovations. It would be the responsibility of the hospital, then, to take note of the events, and to subject those in novations that seemed promising to a more thorough test, always guided by end results. The innovations that survived would be referred to the committee of the college which, in its turn, would select the more worthy ones for further testing at other collaborating hospitals. Then, after more general discussion of the findings at scientific meet ings of the college, descriptions of the surviving innovations would be published in a special issue of the college's journal, identifying, among other things, the persons already expert in the use of each innovation. As a final step, the American Medical Association might, in a special issue of its own journal, publish the subset of innovations that it offi cially endorsed or approved.
By means of this scheme Codman proposes to capture those im provements in care that often go unnoticed, to verify the relative value o f competing claims, to hasten the adoption of proven innovations that languish in obscurity, sometimes for years, and to provide an authorita tive directory of existing expertise. He reminds professional organiza tions of their responsibility to advance the science of medicine. He offers the prospect of multi-institutional, collaborative studies. He ex plicates neatly the relation between quality monitoring in operational settings and clinical research more broadly conceived. And he demon strates a close relation between technology assessment and quality as sessment of which, only recently, we have become more sharply aware.
Establishing A ccoun tability
Just as the profession, generally speaking, is prompted by the end re sult system to discharge its responsibility to advance knowledge, so are the health care institutions enjoined by it to exercise accountability for the care they give. Accountability begins within the institution through a collaboration of medical staff, administrators, and members of the board of trustees; none "has the strength" to accomplish it alone. In this collaboration, the role of the trustees is critical; without, as lay men, entering into the details o f clinical practice, it is their responsibil ity "to insist that the End Result System should be used . . . and that an efficiency committee be appointed to that purpose"; they are also "to authorize the expense and to guarantee the standard o f work reported."
Codman understands, as Reverby (1981) amply documents, that this scheme disturbs the jealously guarded balance o f privilege and power within the hospital, physicians losing while the "superintendent" and the board gain. But this readjustment, Codman believes, is necessary in the interests of the whole; it is also pursuant to his view of the hospital as an organically unified, almost utopian community. "My idea," he says, "is that the Hospital is a place for mutual help. The Patient, the Student, the Profession, the Chief o f Service, the Trustee, the Commu nity, and World-wide Medical Science -each are part owners of 'the case.' We must all be working to learn from, to teach from, to study, to organize to aid, to be trusted by, to contribute to, to record, and to analyze each 'case' and all 'cases.'" The end result system, Codman be lieves, "subordinates the individual interests of the staff, if those in terests are incompatible with this ideal; it boldly encourages them, when they are not."
From this image of vigilance and harmony, one can also deduce a second direction in which accountability must flow: from the institu tion to the public it claims to serve. It would deeply surprise everyone, Codman believes, to know that end results are not consistently studied and documented. "They suppose that of course som ebody is looking
A vedis D onahedian into this important matter. They do not realize that the responsibility is not fixed upon any person or department." It follows that hospitals must formally and solemnly assume that responsibility, certifying to the public the standard of care they can expect to get, and even offer ing evidence to support the claim. In his views of the nature of the hospital, of its social responsibility, and of its accountability to a more exigent public, Codman seems more a man of our time than of his.
A llo catin g Resources a n d M anaging Them E fficiently
Turning now to the internal operations of the hospital, we see the im portant role Codman assigned to the end result system in making financial decisions and establishing personnel policies cmcial to the hospital's performance. Because the end result is the tme product of health care, it needs to be measured if information about the produc tivity and efficiency of the hospital is to be obtained. Moreover, it is the contribution to desired end results that should determine how money is spent in equipping and running the hospital. "In this hospital," Codman says, "I have to use my judgment in proportioning expenditure. . . . The prevention of waste and the judg ment of the proportion which each item should take, in order to be sure of a product -the satisfied and relieved patient -is the essence of good hospital management. This idea of proportioning the expendimre to th e item s necessary to ob tain a p e rfe c t p ro d u c t has never penetrated hospital managements. Their minds have been satisfied with treat m ent, n o t with the g o o d results of treatment. Before Trustees vote more funds for new buildings and equipment, let them appoint Effi ciency Committees to make analyses of the results that they are getting now. They can then decide whether to spend money for improvement in quality or in quantity-for products or waste products."
Settin g Personnel Policies
That end results must govern the personnel policies o f hospitals and the career prospects o f physicians is a major tenet of Codman's creed. Nowhere is Codman more vehement in his condemnation than when he describes appointments by "nepotism" or special influence; assign M7 ment of cases to their attendants "by the ward, by the calendar, or by the time of day"; and promotion by "seniority," a criterion that can advance the less qualified while their betters (himself among them) are unfairly held back. Verified information about the end results obtained by each doctor is the obvious antidote to this irrationality and injustice. Acting accordingly would encourage the less self-promoting, and re ward the more meritorious, while it also improves the patient's pros pects. With the Machiavellian subtlety that Codman often displays, he proposes to harness the selfish drive for advancement to the service of the good. "Unless we use a merit system of promotion instead of a seniority system," he argues, "there will be little incentive for clinical accuracy. The struggle f o r existence m ust be u tiliz e d to g ive th e tru th f u l a n d e ffic ie n t an op p o rtu n ity to survive. "
Prom oting F unctional D ifferen tiation
The logical conclusion of Codman's scheme for case assignment accord ing to end results is considerable differentiation within hospitals, to the point of assigning special wards to particular kinds of patients, to be cared for by persons who have demonstrated (based on end results, of course) special competence in the matter at hand. Perhaps Codman also has in mind that the larger number of similar cases treated in such units would also contribute to better results, seeing that he was aware of the relation between volume and quality, a subject that has attracted much attention of late.
The counterpart to functional differentiation within the hospital is a similar differentiation of institutions in a community or region, some hospitals limiting themselves to simpler cases that they are capable of handling perfectly well, while other hospitals accept the more difficult cases. "For instance," Codman says, "the standard of an ideal local hos pital would be to accept no cases which it cannot cure or relieve." have no ob lig ation " he goes on to say, speaking of his own hospital, 'Vo accept cases which we cannot diagnose, o r those which we are n o t ab le to tre a t. . . . Is there any other hospital which is willing to admit that it is second class, and sets its price according to its standard rather than according to the wealth of the patient?" Codman then gives a rather lengthy list of conditions that he has resolved not to treat be cause analysis of his own end results has revealed lack of success. The into this important matter. They do not realize that the responsibility is not fixed upon any person or department." It follows that hospitals must formally and solemnly assume that responsibility, certifying to the public the standard of care they can expect to get, and even offer ing evidence to support the claim. In his views of the nature of the hospital, of its social responsibility, and of its accountability to a more exigent public, Codman seems more a man of our time than of his.
A llocatin g Resources a n d M anaging Them E fficiently
Turning now to the internal operations of the hospital, we see the im portant role Codman assigned to the end result system in making financial decisions and establishing personnel policies cmcial to the hospital's performance. Because the end result is the true product of health care, it needs to be measured if information about the produc tivity and efficiency of the hospital is to be obtained. Moreover, it is the contribution to desired end results that should determine how money is spent in equipping and running the hospital. 
Settin g P ersonnel Policies
That end results must govern the personnel policies o f hospitals and the career prospects of physicians is a major tenet o f Codman's creed. Nowhere is Codman more vehement in his condemnation than when he describes appointments by "nepotism" or special influence; assign M 7 ment of cases to their attendants "by the ward, by the calendar, or by the time of day"; and promotion by "seniority," a criterion that can advance the less qualified while their betters (himself among them) are unfairly held back. Verified information about the end results obtained by each doctor is the obvious antidote to this irrationality and injustice. Acting accordingly would encourage the less self-promoting, and re ward the more meritorious, while it also improves the patient's pros pects. With the Machiavellian subtlety that Codman often displays, he proposes to harness the selfish drive for advancement to the service of the good. "Unless we use a merit system of promotion instead of a seniority system," he argues, "there will be little incentive for clinical accuracy. The struggle f o r existence m ust be u tiliz e d to g ive th e tru th f u l a n d e ffic ie n t an o p p o rtu n ity to survive. "
From oting F unctional D ifferen tiation
The logical conclusion of Codman's scheme for case assignment accord ing to end results is considerable differentiation within hospitals, to the point of assigning special wards to particular kinds of patients, to be cared for by persons who have demonstrated (based on end results, of course) special competence in the matter at hand. Perhaps Codman also has in mind that the larger number of similar cases treated in such units would also contribute to better results, seeing that he was aware of the relation between volume and quality, a subject that has attracted much attention o f late.
The counterpart to functional differentiation within the hospital is a similar differentiation o f institutions in a community or region, some hospitals limiting themselves to simpler cases that they are capable of handling perfectly well, while other hospitals accept the more difficult cases. "For instance," Codman says, "the standard of an ideal local hos pital would be to accept no cases which it cannot cure or relieve." " We have no o b lig a tio n " he goes on to say, speaking of his own hospital, "to accept cases which we cannot diagnose, o r those which we are n o t ab le to tre a t. . . . Is there any other hospital which is willing to admit that it is second class, and sets its price according to its standard rather than according to the wealth of the patient?" Codman then gives a rather lengthy list of conditions that he has resolved not to treat be cause analysis of his own end results has revealed lack of success. The list includes "oblique fractures of the clavicle in young ladies who wear low-neck gowns," itself a wryly self-deprecating reference to the un sightly callus he inflicted on such a patient in his own practice.
We might pause for a moment to contenaplate how firmly the end result idea has taken hold of Codman's thought, and how thoroughly it has begun to reshape his images of health care. It is, now, the sover eign principle that, if embodied in the health care system, would en able it, almost without further intervention, to serve successfully the public good. It would do so, as one would expect, by generating the information that permits appropriate choices to be made by tmstees, administrators, doctors, and consumers alike-a necessity as acute today as it ever was.
E ffectuating In fo rm ed Choice by Physicians a n d Prospective Patients
As to the doctors, Q>dman recognizes the pivotal role of the general practitioner as the patient's adviser and, as he calls him, "the arbiter between patient and consultant. " For that, he needs to be amply paid; but more important, he needs to be helped to match a patient's needs to the specialist's abilities. "The unexpurgated deluge of medical arti cles through medical journals and bulletins of commercial dmggists, to the abyss of proprietary advertisements, is constandy increasing," Codman laments. "The most acute practitioner cannot distinguish the wheat from the chaff, and litde organized effort is made to help him."
The consumer is even more perplexed. "Our profession," Codman observes, "is being more or less justly criticised in our own journals and in the lay press because we have provided no satisfactory method whereby the layman may be prompdy and economically attended by the particular specialist best qualified to treat each o f his ills." "No one, be he rich or poor, knows whether he really has the services of a good surgeon. 'This is because our Charitable Hospitals, which could do so, do not find out which surgeons get the best results, and let the public know."
As to the specialist who claims, as Codman did, some special compe tence, a "dense wall" of convention forbids him to intervene. "Could this wall be penetrated by any form of advertisement consistent with medical ethics.?" Codman asks. The answers he provides are far-2-51 routine operations just as successfully as the brilliant operators, and we only ask payment for our actual work. Why pay a high price for speed of production o f an unstandardized article, when you can obtain at rea sonable price a guaranteed standard article?"
As to the cases that require a particular expertness, the fee would correspond, Codman proposes, to each surgeon's ability to obtain bet ter results. "It is in such cases that the difference would show. . . . He might have saved 5 per cent, 10 per cent, or 50 per cent, but the value of his services compared to mine would vary with this percentage-but only in these extremely sick cases." Codman went so far as to suggest that no payment be made unless the patient gets well; and he offered to be governed by this precept himself.
Having identified the probability of attaining better end results as the determinant of fair pricing, both in and outside hospitals, Codman turns to the problem o f assigning a money value to that probability. He hits upon yet another principle much in fashion today: the value of the life saved and of the suffering relieved. He realizes, however, that this could reintroduce that variability according to ability to pay that he wished to avoid. He ponders the question for a while. In his words, "There are certain conditions under which an operation will save life. The financial value o f such an operation will depend to a certain extent on how much the person who pays the bill values the life that is saved. It depends on whether it is your own life (and how much you enjoy it), your wife's life (and how much you care for it), or some 'poor relation's life (and how worthless you think it is). . . . The same may be said of those operations which do not save life, but merely relieve suffering. Most persons value an operation which relieves their suffering more than one which saves their life. . . . If you needed an operation, you might be willing to pay $1,000 or more for a 1 per cent better chance, but how much more are you willing to pay for an increased 1 per cent chance in the case of your poor relation?"
In the end, perhaps discouraged by the complexity of his scheme, and possibly also reluctant to endorse invidious valuations of human life, Codman cuts through the Gordian knot with a grand proposal. "The proper way to pay for a successful operation," he concludes, "is to pay the surgeon a reasonable sum for his expert labor, and then give a large sum to some endowed institution for the advancement of surgical science. You owe much more to surgical science than you do to the sur geon." It is as if the institutions responsible for advancing the science of health care were to be paid a royalty for contributions that Codman (1914b) recognized to be one of their "products."
Stim u lating Fair C om petition
Much of Codman's thinking on all the matters I have described was conditioned by his awareness of the high mission of the medical profes sion and its responsibility to serve. But he recognized, as well, that the practice of medicine is also a business, that physicians respond to pecu niary incentives, that health cate services are, so to speak, manufac tured, and are offered for sale in a marketplace. He strived, therefore, to introduce those changes that would harness the drive for finanrial success to achieving the more altruistic mission of the profession.
Accordingly, Codman imagined a market that was to be more free and more fair. He fulminated, in particular, against the "Charitable Institutions," regarding them as "Combinations in the Restraint of Trade," and their doctors as greedy competitors intent on using "the prestige of the hospital to corner the 'material,'" meaning patients. Certified as expert by virtue of their clinical ranks and academic tides, using the hospital's resources to care for their own padents, they had an unfair advantage, while refusing to reveal their end results in return for the privileges they enjoyed. "I would gladly be beaten in fact," Codman says, comparing himself to such a compedtor, "if he can and does do better work than I do; but not because his Hospital, w ithout look in g in to his w ork, guarantees him." Codman's little hospital was meant to be his slingshot against Goliath, but it was clearly failing. So Codman dreamed of bigger things: of surgeons banding together in groups to counter the orga nized outpatient services of the charitable hospitals; of physicians, sur geons, and specialists raising capital (perhaps coopcradvely), building and equipping a large hospital, and forcing "the cliques who mn the Charitable Hospitals out into the open, so the Public can compare our results." In this way, Codman's vision foreshadowed the resurgence of private investment and other market forces in the health care system of today.
As I have already shown, Codman believed that adopdon of the end result system would, in itself, propel formal organizadons and markets alike toward the two objectives he so ardendy sought: efficiency and fairness. In the meantime, in the face of opposition, he fought backwith publicity, pursuasion, and, if necessary, ridicule, for "Harvard is sensitive to ridicule," he shrewdly observed, "and also, I sincerely be lieve," he added, "to presentation o f facts." It is these facts that we see more clearly today. He has been called an "eccentric," he knows; he is a "zealot," he confesses; he is "driven by his Puritan conscience . . . to preach the doctrine I had expounded," he admits. For a while even his own sanity seems to him to be in doubt.
Codman the Man
Yet, all this anguish notwithstanding, Codman knew very well the value of his discovery. So he hoped, at times angrily impatient and at other times philosophically resigned, for eventual vindication. "A l though the End Result Idea may not achieve its entire fulfillment for several generations," he said, "I hope to be as content when dying as any soldier on the battlefield. . . . Honors, except those I have thrust on myself, are conspicuously absent on my chart, but I am able to en joy the hypothesis that I may receive some from a more receptive generation." Above all, Codman sought recognition by the hospital in which he had trained, where the end result idea had first occurred to him, and where for 15 years he had tried to implant it; and from Harvard, the institution that had nurtured and shaped him, only, it seemed, to fail him in his hour of need. "I was confident," Codman tells us, "that the End Result Idea would become an intellectual landmark of which my university would be proud, and which, in time. Harvard would claim as a jewel in her crown, and set it with the diamonds of ether anaesthe sia and social service." In a poignant gesture, Codman shows in one corner of that infamous cartoon he used to ridicule the Harvard estab lishment, a long line of tiny figures, hardly distinguishable in the re production he had published. They ate "armies of medical smdents," Codman explains, "coming to Harvard because they have heard that the End Result System will be installed in her affiliated hospitals." I like to picture him setting out into the great outdoors whose call, from earliest childhood, he could not resist. I see him, as he himself describes, on a summer day, adrift "on some out-of-the-way pond in [his] portable boat, watching the cotton wool in the clouds, and mo mentarily expecting a strike from *a big one.'" Or, perhaps he is out hunting, surrounded by the happy crowd o f all the dogs he ever owned. But, most vividly, I see him reenact that marvelous drawing with which he concludes his book on The S h o u ld er, a balloon high against what I imagine to be a deep-blue summer sky, decked with bil lowing clouds, Codman, himself, a little figure standing in the basket dangling beneath, unfurling a huge banner in the breeze. On it, in large letters, are the words by which he lived, and with which he bids us farewell: "The End Result Idea."
